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The extinction and de-extinction of species
I. Introduction
When death came for Celia, it took the form of tree. Heedless of the danger posed
by branches overladen with snow, Celia wandered through the landscape of Spain’s
Ordesa national park in January 2000. branch fell on her skull and crushed it. So
death came and took her, leaving body to be found by park rangers and legacy to
be mourned by conservationists around the world.
The conservationists mourned not only the death of the organism, but also an
attendant decrease in biodiversity. Celia was the last member of the subspecies
Capra pyrenaica pyrenaica better known as the Pyrenean ibex; when she died, so
too did the taxon become extinct.
Where most stories would end, Celia’s story—or at least the story of her DNA—had
just begun. Biologists had collected tissue samples from her body shortly before her
passing. Using cells cultured from those samples, scientists working for the
company Advanced Cell Technology set about cloning Celia. The fruit of their labor
was born in 2009 and survived for seven minutes before succumbing to lung
problems. Celia’s clone did represent material triumph of resurrection biology,
more popularly known as de-extinction (Folch et al 2009; Pina-Aguilar et al 2009).
At the moment, numerous research groups around the world are working towards
de-extinction of different species. Efforts are under way, for example, to engineer
passenger pigeon (Ectopistes migratorius from the genome of the related bandtailed pigeon (Patagioenas fasciata (Zimmer 2013; O’Connor 2015). Woolly
mammoths might be cloned from the tissues preserved in the permafrost of the
Siberian tundra (Loi et al 2011). Alternatively, an Indian elephant (Elephas
maximus genome might serve as template (Salsberg 2000). Several groups are
working towards cloning Tasmanian tigers (Greer 2009).
Worries regarding anthropogenic extinction have this far, at least partly, been based
on view about irreversibility of extinction. As Johan-Wolfgang Wägele (2014) puts
it, “[…] the political support for actions that can mitigate biodiversity losses is halfhearted and inadequate. This is extremely dangerous, because loss of species is
irreversible […] life forms, once lost, cannot regenerate.” The developments in
resurrection biology question this vary basic tenet of conservation. Resurrection
biology is taken to imply that “the revival of an extinct species is no longer fantasy”
(Zimmer 2013) or that “extinction might not be forever […]” (Redford et al. 2013).
Consequently, developments in resurrection biology are often met with enthusiasm.

Yet, the possibility of future success in resurrection biology raises many questions.
Some are empirical: can resurrected species be reintroduced into the wild? What
are the environmental costs and benefits of species resurrection? Other questions
are philosophical. In this essay we address some of these philosophical questions. In
particular, we consider whether the goals of resurrection biology are conceptually
coherent. Our inquiry analyses two related concepts relevant to the resurrection:
the concept of extinction and the concept of species. Through the analyses of them
we demonstrate, first, the implications that resurrection biology may have for the
conceptual foundations of life sciences, and second, implications that different
species concepts and understandings of extinction may have on the status of
animals produced by de-extinction technologies.
Before engaging our inquiry, we will first briefly describe “de-extinction” techniques
and technologies in Part II below. In Part III we present four different species
concepts and three different ways of understanding extinction. We also raise the
challenge of seeing extinction as something necessarily final. In Part IV we apply the
presented concepts to resurrection biology and discuss the possible ways of fitting
resurrection biology together with the idea of finality of extinction. In part we
discuss the species and extinction concepts that are compatible with resurrection
biology if extinction is not seen as necessarily final. Finally, we conclude in Part VI
with thoughts on further implications of our analysis.

II. De-extinction
The goal of resurrection biology is deceptively simple in its articulation: it is to make
extinct species extant once more. As we will see, however, this simple formulation
begs number of theoretical questions. Phrased more neutrally, resurrection
biology aims to produce animals that are (to high degree) similar to members of
extinct species. These kinds of animals can be created either through selective
breeding or through different applications of cloning technologies.
Resurrection biology’s earliest attempts took the form of “back-breeding”(Oksanen
Siipi 2014). Through well-practiced methods of husbandry, skilled breeders may
cross extant lineages towards the end of replicating phenotypes, and perhaps even
genotypes, of closely-related extinct lineages. This method is structurally identical to
other forms of artificial selection, with one key difference: instead of producing new
organisms in existing breeds or new types of breeds, the goal is to produce animals
that are similar to members of extinct breeds. More recently, conservationists have
considered the possibility that this technique, also known as “lineage fusion,” could
resurrect extinct subspecies of Galápagos tortoises (Poulakakis et al 2008; Garrick
et al 2014).
The more publicized versions of resurrection biology are based on applying the
cloning technologies (Zimmer 2013). In fact, there are two methods by which the
goal of resurrection can be achieved: through somatic cell nuclear transfer or
through genetic engineering (Sherkow Greely 2013; Oksanen Siipi 2014).

Resurrection by somatic cell nuclear transfer (abbreviated to SCNT) is quite similar
to “ordinary” cloning exemplified in the famed sheep Dolly. SCNT’s use in
resurrection biology is popularized by works such as Jurassic Park and it is
sometimes called cross-species cloning (Wilmut et al 1999; Zimmer 2013.) The
resurrection process begins with the cultivation of somatic cell’s nucleus from the
tissue of the extinct species. That nucleus, including its full complement of genetic
material, is then inserted into an enucleated egg of another species. member of
that species works as surrogate mother. When carried to term, the procedure
produces nearly-identical twins to the members of the extinct species; the only
genetic differences would be in the organisms’ mitochondrial and immune cell DNA
(Hiendleder et al 2004).
SCNT is the means by which Celia was cloned. This method is also studied as
means of resurrecting species such as gastric brooding frogs (Rheobatrachus silus
(Archer 2013), woolly mammoths (Mammuthus primigenius (Loi et al 2011), and
Tasmanian tigers (Thylacinus cynocephalus (Greer 2009).
As method of resurrection biology, genetic engineering is similar to SCNT in that
an organism is produced from the implantation of modified embryo into
surrogate mother; the difference between the methods lies in the origin of the
embryo’s genetic material. De-extinction through genetic engineering begins with
the cultivation of genetic material from member of sister taxon to the target
extinct species, rather than from tissue of the extinct species itself. When genomic
differences between the extinct species and its sister taxon can be identified, the
genetic material from the donor organism can be modified to match the extinct
species’ genome. The modified genetic material is placed into the donor nucleus,
which is then inserted into an enucleated egg, which is in turn implanted into the
surrogate mother. This method has the advantage of potentially increasing the
genetic similarity between clone and donor organism: engineers might reconstitute
the donor’s mitochrondrial DNA, thereby offsetting potential problems in the SCNT
process such as those outlined by Hiendleder et al (2004).
passenger pigeon (Ectopistes migratorius might be resurrected this way from the
genome of the related band-tailed pigeon (Patagioenas fasciata (Zimmer 2013;
O’Connor 2015). Horner Gorman (2009) go as far as suggesting that non-avian
dinosaurs might be engineered from the genome of domestic chicken; Bhullar et al
(2015) have made progress in deriving dinosaur phenotype from the chicken’s
genotype1
The reproduction of nonavian dinosaur traits differs from the resurrection of the
passenger pigeon in one important respect: the latter would be the result of
replicating an organism’s entire genome whereas the former would be the result of
replicating an organism’s gene sequences. Nevertheless, this is difference of
degree rather than of kind; certainly, if sufficient number of nonavian dinosaur
traits were to be replicated then the entirety of nonavian dinosaur phenotype
1

Each of these methods of resurrection biology faces practical obstacles and
limitations. To wit: back-breeding can only resurrect extinct taxa below the species
category; SCNT and genetic engineering are viable only for extinct taxa whose
developmental environments were sufficiently similar to those of surrogates;
genetic engineering assumes antecedent knowledge of the extinct taxon’s genome.
Nevertheless, many of the obstacles are contingent on the state of our technological
art. The success of resurrection biology may not be inevitable, but it may be likelier
than not (Stone 2003; Zimmer 2013).
In addition to these practical obstacles, however, there are significant conceptual
challenges to be met. In this paper we question the common views regarding the
success of resurrection biology. It is not self-evident that animals created by above
described methods are members of the extinct species (e.g. Pyrenean ibex, woolly
mammoth, passenger pigeon, or gastric brooding frog). One need not take it for
granted that the irreversibility of extinction can (or will) be changed by the
technological developments described above.

III. Concepts of species and extinction
III.1. Species concepts
One of the most intractable issues in the philosophy of biology is the species
problem. We do not expect to resolve here the question of how to conceive and
delineate species, but we do believe that the foregoing discussion carries
implications that should direct future debates. theorist’s view of resurrection
biology should be compatible with the theorist’s choice of species concept.
One reason that debate over the species problem remains so vigorous is that
disputants cannot agree on what exactly is at stake. The number of species concepts
currently under consideration may range anywhere between one (Wilkins 2009)
and more than two dozen (Mayden 1997). We will not enumerate the variety of
species concepts here. Instead, we follow Okasha (2002) in distinguishing four basic
categories of species concepts. This schema should be broad enough to
accommodate any reader’s chosen concept; it should also remain informative
enough to demonstrate how one’s views regarding the success and possibility of
resurrection biology and the choice of species concept are necessarily closely
connected to each other.
Okasha argues that species concepts may be fundamentally categorized as phenetic,
biological, ecological, or phylogenetic. Phenetic concepts define species membership
in terms of overall trait similarity. Concepts falling under this category, including
Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster theory (1999) or Devitt’s new biological
would follow. Whether or not scientists can know when they have succeeded in
replicating dinosaur phenotype is separate epistemological question.

essentialism (2008), tend to treat species as natural kinds or at least as sets of
organisms (Kitcher 1984). Biological concepts, tracing most explicitly back to
Dobzhansky (1937), define species membership in terms of intrinsic reproductive
isolating mechanisms. Organisms are then seen to belong to same species if it is
actually possible for them to interbreed.2 Ecological concepts, by contrast, define
species membership in terms of extrinsic reproductive isolating mechanisms.
Species as conceived biologically or ecologically are counted as units in the
biological ontology, either as individuals (Ghiselin 1987) or as sets (Kitcher 1984;
see also Ereshefsky 2010). Phylogenetic concepts define species membership in
terms of genealogical history, as in the lineage concepts endorsed by Simpson
(1961) and De Quieroz (1998).
The description of species concepts rarely, if ever, includes conditions for species’
extinction. Ghiselin (1987) argues that the extinction of species is analogous with
the death of an organism, but this is not an especially informative claim given the
vagueness of organismal death (Zandt et al 2011). To wit: one may endorse
Dobzhansky’s biological species concept—as Ghiselin does and college-level texts
often do—and therefore conceive species as units, but this commitment offers little
help in classifying poor Celia at the time of her death. On the one hand, the last C.
pyrenaica pyrenaica was obviously not part of any population capable of producing
viable offspring through natural means of reproduction3 on the other hand, it seems
prima facie absurd to assert that the last C. pyrenaica pyrenaica was not, in fact,
member of the taxon C. pyrenaica pyrenaica At minimum, the choice of species
concept is ambiguous with respect to the definition of “extinction.”
Biological species concepts may be operational, i.e. testable in practice, or
theoretical (Mayden 1997). Ernst Mayr, the most vocal proponent of biological
concepts, distinguished between these senses of his biological species concept by
reference either to actual interbreeding between organisms (in the operational
sense) or to potential interbreeding between organisms (in the theoretical sense)
(Stamos 2003). In order to recognize organisms’ potential to interbreed, concept
must specify some salient trait similarity between those organisms, such as
Paterson’s specific mate recognition system (1985) or overall genetic similarity (see
Mayden 1997). In this sense, the theoretical sense of biological species concepts is
functionally indistinguishable from phenetic species concepts. When we refer to
biological concepts, then, we mean specifically the operational sense of those
concepts.
3 One might argue that Celia bore traits that demonstrated her reproductive
compatibility with other members of the subspecies, and that we could therefore
recognize her as member of that taxon; but doing so would entail rejecting an
operational view of the biological species concept (see note 2). Given Celia’s
separation in time from members of the taxon C. pyrenaica pyrenaica she could not
actually interbreed with any organism in that taxon; it is for this reason that
Simpson (1961) and Mayr argue that the biological species concept is not
operational across the temporal dimension (see Stamos 2003).
2

While species concept choice does not imply any particular definition of extinction,
the converse does not hold. How one defines extinction does carry implications for
which species concept one may choose. The debate over de-extinction may
therefore contribute information that advances the species problem.
III.2. Extinction concepts and the challenge of finality
The term ‘extinction’ can refer to four different kinds of disappearance of species.
species can vanish by hybridization with another interfertile species. It can also
give birth to two (or more) new daughter species through allopatric speciation.
Sometimes species slowly transforms itself into new species. However, what is
under interest in resurrection biology is type of extinction in which species vanish
from the ontological ledger without evolving into or merging with some other taxon.
(Delord 2007; Delord 2014.) Extinction is then said to come through termination of
lineage (Raup and Stanley 1971). According to our knowledge, ongoing
resurrection projects concern animals that are extinct in this last mentioned sense.4
As Julien Delord (2014) puts it, “people get excited by the possibility of recreation of
totally extinct species, and not on species that were only submitted to process of
anaphyletic change of specification”. The type of extinction under interest in
resurrection biology has in literature also been called “final extinction” (Delord
2007; Delord 2014) and “true extinction” (Raup 1991).
The enthusiasm for resurrection biology is often based on conviction that finality of
‘final extinction’ or ‘true extinction’ can be changed by the technologies described
above. Resurrection biology is commonly presented as similar to advances in
medicine: just as we may cure diseases that were formerly terminal, resurrection
biology may change extinction from terminal state to temporary one. The idea
then is that extinction has this far been irreversible merely because scientists have
lacked practical tools for revising it. This might be called practical irreversibility.
Some theorists dispute this view. Alistair Gunn is among the opponents. He argues
that
extinct also says something about future of the class that once it becomes
null class, it can never come to have members again. It may even be claimed
that this is what extinct means. If so, then the question, “Can extinct species
be recreated?” is answered negatively by resort to what is sometimes called
“definitional stop”.
Wildlife preservationist are always telling us, as warning, that “Extinction is
forever!”. Perhaps this warning tells us no more about the world than
“Bachelors are unmarried!” […] An extinct species is one that has come to an
The projects also seem to concern charismatic animals and animals that have gone
extinct because of human activities.
4

end, has died out, is permanently null class. As we use the word extinct it
seems, the recreation of an extinct species is logical impossibility. (1991)
According to Gunn, finality of extinction is conceptual necessity: for him extinction
is irreversible not just in practice but also in principle. Can Gunn’s view be accepted?
If extinction is necessarily final, how should the animals born from de-extinction
procedures be understood? Ideas about resurrection biology making extinction nonfinal rests on certain views regarding species and extinction, but also Gunn’s view
has strong ties to certain (other) species and extinction concepts. We will next
present three ways of fitting Gunn’s view together with current technological
developments in resurrection science. Of each of the three alternatives we present
its implications regarding concepts of species and extinction. In order to
demonstrate these implications, we will employ the example of Celia and her
clone—let’s call the latter Delia.5

IV. Finality of extinction and implications of the concepts
IV.1. First alternative: replication
According to the first alternative, animals created by resurrection biology do not
belong to the original species (such as the Pyrenean ibex, woolly mammoth, and
passenger pigeon.)6 Even when morphological, genetic and behavioral properties of
the animals produced by resurrection biology are to great extent similar to
members of the extinct species in question they cannot and should not be
considered as members of that species.
This alternative requires that classification of an organism does not depend (at least
solely or mainly) on its features and properties. Two animals can belong to
different species even though they are to very high extent similar with respect to
their (genetic) properties. By this standard, it is possible for Delia to be classified
outside the taxon C. pyrenaica pyrenaica even if Celia—the organism from which
Delia’s genome was derived—is member of that taxon.
To accept this view requires rejection of phenetic species concepts. If species are
defined by similarities between organisms then two fully developed organisms
sharing the same genome ought to be members of the same species; given the
The case of Celia and Delia concerns extinction and de-extinction of subspecies.
Yet, in the paper the interest is in the extinction of species and in the species
concept. For the sake of the argument and in order to include real life case of Celia
and Delia, we presuppose that extinction of sub-species is an instance of real
extinction. As result, we also presuppose that questions presented about deextinction in this paper can and should be answered similarly regarding species and
sub-species. These presuppositions, however, are not detrimental to our general
argument regarding species concept and species extinction.
6 For discussion of this suggestion see Siipi 2014; Garvey 2007; Delord 2014.
5

assumption that Celia and Delia are members of different species, we would have to
conclude that species are not defined by similarities between organisms. According
to Gunn this is desirable outcome: “classification [of species] is supposed to exhibit
evolutionary relationships, not mere morphological similarities: to provide
explanations and not merely descriptions” (1991).
The central problem of the first alternative is that it does not seem consistent with
views generally held regarding clones. Dolly, the cloned sheep, is generally accepted
to be sheep (Siipi 2014). Gunn (1991) and Delord (2014) are certainly right in
claiming that clone of any individual is not identical to that individual.
hypothetical clone of Charles Darwin, for example, is not Charles Darwin, but
numerically distinct individual genetically identical to him. Nevertheless, even
though Darwin’s clone is not Darwin, his clone is quite generally accepted to be
human being (Garvey 2007; Siipi 2014). Thus, the supporters of this first alternative
have several questions to answer. What is that crucial difference between
“ordinary” cloning and resurrection biology because of which outcomes of the latter
fail to be members of the target species? If Delia is not C. pyrenaica pyrenaica what
is she?
There are at least four possibilities. First, an animal produced by de-extinction
procedures might be considered as hybrid organism for example, hybrid
between mammoth and an elephant. second possibility is to see the organisms
produced as chimeras. (Delord 2014.) However, these alternatives considerably
stretch the current meanings of the terms ‘hybrid’ and ‘chimera’. Thus, adoption of
new term denoting merely to mixes of species produced by cross-species cloning
might be third, and better, alternative. Seen in these ways, de-extinction
procedures might still be seen as partly successful. Even though these procedures
cannot bring extinct species back to life, they are able to create some kind of mixes
between the extinct species and other (closely related) species. By this logic, the
extinct species remains extinct.
Fourth, the animals produced by de-extinction procedures might be seen to belong
to new human created species that may be understood as copy of (and thus
distinct from the) the original species (Garvey 2007; Delord 2014; Siipi 2014). We
call this third possibility replication Can it be accepted and what are its
implications?
One might, following Gunn (1991) and Delord (2014) argue for replication by noting
that the environment and ecological roles of the members of the extinct species and
of the animals created by resurrection biology are likely to differ lot. For example,
woolly mammoth created by resurrection biology would have to live with
elephants (or alone or, at best, in small group with other similarly produced
animals) and in an environment widely different from the one of the original woolly
mammoths. According to this line of thought, species may well, as noted by Robert
Elliot (1994) have members that are artificially created. Yet, the living conditions of
members of the original species and the animals born through de-extinction

procedures differ dramatically. Moreover, despite their genetic similarity, the
animals created by resurrection biology differ from the extinct species with respect
to their cellular machinery (mitochondria, ribosomes etc) (Zimmer 2013). These
two issues do not hold with respect to (ordinary) clones. They and their surrogate
mothers belong to same species and they live in communities of the species from
which they are cloned. Yet, these differences may not be sufficient for justifying the
alternative of replication Epigenetic variations per se are insufficient for
distinguishing species (Bentley et al 2004; cf Delord 2014). Neither are even great
differences to so-called ‘normal’ behavior usually considered as threats to species
status.
One might claim that even if it were possible to create organisms that are not just
genetically but also morphologically and behaviorally totally similar to members of
the original species, these animals still may fail to members of the original species.
The reason is that the created animals lack the necessary connection with the
original species. What is crucial for species membership is continuity and lineage
between its members. According to this line of thought, “a species went definitely
extinct at the end of the reproductive or living process, and so there is no
resurrection at all: we only witness the results of human modification on the living
process of the bearing species, which is another stream of life than the extinct one”
(Delord 2014).
This way of classifying Delia as member of species distinct from C. pyrenaica
pyrenaica is consistent with biological and ecological species concepts. Since
biological concepts are intended to be operational—that is, testable in actual
practice—then it follows that Celia and Delia should be classified in different
species, since their spatio-temporal separation would make it impossible to test the
compatibility of any relevant intrinsic mechanisms for reproductive isolation7
Ecological concepts allow that spatial distance may be sufficient for species
distinctions by ecological standards (Van Valen 1976); temporal distance is an even
more effective extrinsic mechanism for reproductive isolation.
Proponents of biological species concepts often deny that their concepts are
operational across the temporal dimension (see supra note 3). It is for this reason
that Simpson (1961) argued for supplementing biological species concepts with his
“successional species concept” for the purposes of phylogenetic reconstruction. One
may argue that Celia and Delia have traits that give them the potential to interact
within the same reproductively isolated population; however, Hull argues that
‘unrealized potentialities don’t count’ in diagnosing species membership by
biological standards (1965). Even laboratory tests performed using Celia’s
preserved genetic information would therefore be insufficient to demonstrate the
conspecificity of Celia with clones: if two organisms do not actually bear the
appropriate relation prescribed by biological concepts then they are in fact not
members of the same species. Whether this should be considered virtue or vice
of biological concepts is left to the reader to decide.
7

Phylogenetic species concepts may or may not be consistent with classification of
Celia and Delia in different species. The key point is how one defines biological
lineage. Ghiselin, for example, conceives lineages as concrete entities delimited in
space and time by particular kind of connectedness between species members
(1987). Lineages of this kind preclude the classification of Delia with Celia, given
their spatio-temporal separation. However, one might alternatively conceive of
lineages in terms of the transmission of genetic information, in which case the
identification of Delia’s genetic information with Celia’s would entail their
classification in the same species (Garvey 2007; Delord 2014).
IV.2. Second alternative: re-creation
The second alternative for fitting resurrection science together with finality of
extinction is to claim that animals created are members of the species (e.g. Pyrenean
Ibex woolly mammoth, Passenger Pigeon, etc) that once went extinct. Yet, despite
their existence, the species remains extinct. This alternative is called re-creation By
this standard, C pyrenaica pyrenaica would be an extinct sub-species even following
the creation of its new member, Delia. The alternative of re-creation may sound
surprising for it requires possibility of species being extinct even though it has
living members. Could such statement be intellectually acceptable?
Non-existence is certainly conceptually central to extinction. It might even be
suggested that it follows from the definition of extinction that if species is extinct,
then there are no living organisms that belong to it. But has the non-existence have
to permanent? As noted by David M. Raup, the word ‘extinct’ is an adjective (1991).
Animals are said to go extinct or to become extinct The alternative of re-creation is
based on understanding going or becoming extinct as process It is process in
which species becomes null class through the death of the last member of the
species. When that process is complete the species is extinct and, crucially to the
alternative of re-creation, remains extinct whatever happens later. Resurrection
biology is unable to change species status from extinct to non-extinct because the
process of extinction has already been completed. Once species becomes null
class it remains extinct, even though it may be caused to have new members later
(and consequently is no longer null class). If resurrection biology becomes
successful we will have two kinds of extinct species in the future: ones that have
been and others that have not been re-created.
This second alternative, of course, to great extent relies on certain views regarding
extinction. First and foremost, it requires seeing extinction as process: species
becoming null class by the death of the only members of the species. The
alternative is not compatible with seeing extinction as property of species being
null class. The alternative may seem odd, but it is also possible that this oddity is
only apparent and follows from the fact that until now the process of extinction has
always led to permanent non-existence of members of the species in question.
What the success of resurrection biology may change is this contingent connection
between becoming and being null class. However, the term ‘final’ is usually taken

to refer to states of affairs of enumerated objects, not to processes. Thus, if the goal
is to save finality of extinction, and if it is senseless to claim processes to be final,
then claiming that extinction is process is not solution at all.
The more serious problem of the alternative of re-creation is that it does not seem
to be consistent with any species concept presented. Phenetic species concepts
would demand that Delia be classified with Celia, but phenetic concepts—wherein
species membership is defined by the instantiation of individually necessary or
jointly sufficient properties—treat species as natural kinds (Devitt 2008; Ereshefsky
2010). If kind has members, then it most certainly exists; if Delia is member of C.
pyrenaica pyrenaica and if C. pyrenaica pyrenaica is natural kind, then that subspecies must be extant.
The alternative of re-creation is also inconsistent with biological and ecological
species concepts. Since both of these species concepts treat species as concrete
populations, and since all members of C. pyrenaica pyrenaica had died at some point
in the past, it would follow that the species was extinct (Hull 1965; Ghiselin 1987).
Moreover, Delia cannot be classified as member of C. pyrenaica pyrenaica by these
concepts since she cannot be considered member of now-vanished populations.
Similarly, this suggestion is inconsistent with phylogenetic species concepts. By
these concepts, species is extinct if the lineage has ended and an organism is
member of species if it is part of the species’ lineage. To say that C. pyrenaica
pyrenaica is extinct would therefore imply that there can be no future members of
the lineage, but this would be contradicted by Delia’s classification as member of
the sub-species.
Thus, either alternative of re-creation would have to rely on some new kind of view
of species, or its incompatibility with species concepts can be taken to imply the
alternative to be inconsistent and, thus, not successful.
IV.3. Third alternative: non-extinction
The third alternative for fitting Gunn’s view together with resurrection biology is to
claim that in successful cases of cross-species cloning extinction actually never took
place. According to this line of thought, animals produced by cross-species cloning
belong to the target species. Delia, for example, is member of C. pyrenaica
pyrenaica. However, exactly because it is possible to create these animals, extinction
did not happen when all members of the species population died. We call this
alternative non-extinction
The non-extinction alternative is based on the view that extinction can be
conceptualized and understood in several different ways that differ with respect to
the point in which extinction is seen to take place. Most commonly, extinction is
seen to take place when all members of species have died. As noted above,
sometimes extinction is associated with end of reproductive possibilities that is,

with the disappearance of the reproductive population. By this understanding,
species might be considered extinct even though there remain living organisms
classified within the species. This may be the case if all living members belong to the
same sex, or if they are all sterile, or if the population is too small to maintain the
requisite genetic diversity (Tilman et al 1994). This kind of extinction is sometimes
called functional extinction Finally, and relevantly to resurrection biology, it may
also be possible to associate extinction with loss of information sufficient for
producing an individual with characteristics of the species. (Delord 2007.)
According to this line of thought, extinction is not question about whether
species has living members; rather, it is function of propagating genetic (or other
relevant) information. In the case of successful resurrection biology, then, extinction
could never have actually taken place: information necessary for producing
individuals was not lost and it was possible to bring them into existence by cloning
methods.
The third alternative implies that resurrection biology is not, strictly speaking, deextinction or resurrection. Since extinction did not take place, neither can deextinction happen. One oddity of the alternative is that it requires that species may
fail to be extinct even when no animal belonging to it is alive. However, this may not,
be as strange as it first sounds. The plant species Silene stenophylla for example,
persisted for 30,000 years in well-preserved seeds before being cultivated again in
the modern day (Yeshina et al 2012).
The non-extinction alternative is consistent with phenetic species concepts because
those concepts treat species as natural kinds. Hull (1980) argues that natural kinds
may have gaps in time and space between members while the kind itself persists. In
his example, an atomic element such as gold would continue to exist even if every
individual gold atom in the universe were to disappear, because new atoms with the
appropriate atomic number may yet be created. The atomic element itself is class
that may persist despite temporary absence of members. Such would be the case
with species subject to de-extinction. C. pyreneica pyreneica might have seemed to
be extinct following Celia’s death, but the later creation of Delia, new member of
Celia’s species, demonstrates that the species was not in fact extinct.
Phylogenetic species concepts may be likewise consistent with non-extinction,
provided that lineages are defined appropriately. If we take lineage to be
sequence of individuals who propagate some information about the species—be it
genetic or phenotypic—regardless of the means of propagation (as suggested in De
Queiroz 1998), then lineage of living organisms may have gaps in space or time so
long as the important information is preserved. Delia propagates information that
originated in Celia about C. pyreneica pyreneica Delia and Celia are members of the
same species for this reason, and the preservation of relevant information between
the death of the latter and the birth of the former would allow for the persistence of
the species in that timeframe. So long as the lineage is lineage of some kind of
information, rather than lineage of individual organisms, then phylogenetic
species concepts may accommodate the non-extinction view.

By contrast, neither biological nor ecological concepts can be consistent with this
suggestion. Both treat species as populations whose boundaries in time and space
are delimited by particular relations, either between members of the populations
with each other or between members of the populations and their environments. In
our chosen example, Delia simply does not stand in those relations to any
population that would have included Celia, nor could she: those populations are too
distant in space and time for Delia to enter into the appropriate relations with any
members of those populations.

V. Non-final extinction: literal resurrection
What if Gunn’s view about finality of extinction is not accepted? We call literal
resurrection the view that resurrection biology actually can be successful in
reversing extinction through the creation of new members of species that once went
extinct. According to this line of thought, resurrection biology accomplishes two
goals: first, the production of animals that belong to species that is (or more
precisely, has thus far been) extinct; second, change of extinction from final to
non-final state. The organisms produced by resurrection biology are then classified
as the members of the extinct species, and their existence changes the species’
status from extinct to extant. Following this logic, Delia is member of C. pyrenaica
pyrenaica and when she was born the sub-species was (for moment) resurrected
from the species category’s equivalent of death.
Literal resurrection is most obviously compatible with phenetic species concepts,
but this consistency must be qualified. The relevant question here is not about the
species taxon: as repeatedly noted above, phenetic concepts would hold that Celia
and Delia must both be members of C. pyreneica pyreneica given their near-complete
genetic and phenotypic similarity. Instead, the relevant question is about the species
category: are species classes or sets? If the former, then species may persist even if
all of its members are dead; if the latter, then species’ existence depends on the
existence of its constituent members (Stamos 2003).
In the previous section we discussed the possibility that species are natural kind
classes: in that case, C. pyreneica pyreneica would not have really been extinct
between Celia’s death and Delia’s birth. If species are natural kind sets, however, the
implications are different. Sets only exist given the existence of the set’s members
(see Kitcher 1984); since the set associated with C. pyreneica pyreneica had no
members between Celia’s death and Delia’s birth, it would follow that the species
was extinct. Since Celia and Delia must be members of the same species, however,
the relevant set would have to reappear upon Delia’s birth.
The alternative of literal resurrection is certainly inconsistent with biological
species concepts and probably inconsistent with ecological ones. Biological concepts
define species in terms of relations intrinsic to the species, and as we have already
discussed clone such as Delia cannot enter into the requisite intraspecific relations

with members of an extinct species, by definition8 Ecological species concepts,
which define species in terms of relations between members of species and some
extrinsic factor, could allow for literal resurrection in principle assuming that the
relevant extrinsic (i.e., ecological) factors remain constant. In practice, this is
exceedingly unlikely. The constancy of ecological factors associated with species is
contingent on the absence of ecological cascade effects following the species’
extinction, but research shows that such effects may be rapid across variety of
different ecosystems (Pace et al 1999). Delia might be member of C. pyreneica
pyreneica if the ecology of Ordesa national park had remained unchanged following
Celia’s death; however, extinction of C. pyreneica pyreneica itself likely ensured
some ecological change.
Phylogenetic concepts also seem inconsistent with true resurrection. If lineage is
defined both by historical endpoints and connectedness between those points, then
species cannot return from extinction ex hypothesi as Gunn argued. By this
standard, one of the necessary conditions of being member of C. pyrenaica
pyrenaica would be inclusion within an historical lineage that ended with the death
of Celia; since Delia was born after Celia’s death, it follows that Delia cannot be
member of C. pyrenaica pyrenaica and that sub-species must remain extinct. Even
though phylogenetic concepts maybe consistent with Celia and Delia belonging to
the same species, as shown above in the alternative of non-extinction, this is
possible only provided that no extinction has taken place between the genetic
donor’s death and the clone’s birth.

VI. Conclusion
Literal resurrection seems to be the view of resurrection biology closest to popular
conceptions (cf. Zimmer 2013). Assuming that extinction is result of the
disappearance of species population, and that extinction is not necessarily final
state (as literal resurrection presupposes), it follows (for reasons stated above) that
one must adopt phenetic species concept to maintain logical consistency.
However, the technological developments of resurrection biology do not imply that
we must accept the phenetic species concept or the assumptions behind literal
resurrection. As shown above, one may adopt view of resurrection biology that
rejects the literal resurrection view that extinction is not terminal state. One may
accommodate view of extinction as final if one is willing either (a) to give up the
view that Celia and Delia belong to the same species, as would be the case in species
The inconsistency of literal resurrection with biological species concepts rests on
the assumption that biological concepts are operational rather than theoretical (see
footnote 2). If biological concept is taken to be theoretical—that is, if it defines
species in terms of counterfactual relations in addition to real ones—then Delia
might be member of C. pyreneica pyreneica However, this possibility can only be
accepted by reference to phenetic similarity, and so the relevant species concept
underwriting the argument would be phenetic rather than biological.
8

replication or (b) to give up the view of extinction as disappearance of species
population, as would be the case with the non-extinction alternative.
It is notable that no species concept is consistent with all possible views of
resurrection biology, nor is any view of resurrection biology consistent with all
species concepts. Phenetic concepts are incompatible with replication and recreation; biological concepts are incompatible with re-creation, non-extinction, and
literal resurrection; ecological concepts are incompatible with re-creation and
literal resurrection in principle, and with non-extinction in practice; phylogenetic
concepts are incompatible with re-creation and literal resurrection.
What, then, does the progress of resurrection biology imply for biological theory? It
may be significant that biological and ecological concepts are least compatible with
views of de-extinction. Phylogenetic concepts may be more easily compatible with
views of de-extinction, but their inconsistency with literal resurrection requires
significant change to received concepts of extinction. It is for these and similar
reasons that Delord (2014) argues that phenetic concepts are most consistent with
species resurrection. We agree.
Achievements in resurrection biology may soon influence the intellectual bases of
life sciences and especially the concepts of species and extinction. At the same time,
views regarding those very same bases should effect on how one sees and
understands the outcomes of resurrection biology. This would mark useful
cognitive shift among conservationists and biologists, but progress in resurrection
biology could also produce an even rarer jewel: conceptual change among
philosophers. We may cling to old views and devalue this developing technology and
research or we may embrace the science and revise how its important concepts are
defined. That choice is left to the reader.
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